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Fier: Double Jeopardy

I’LL TAKE “IMPROPER DECLARATIONS OF MISTRIAL”
FOR $2,000.00:
APPLYING THE PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT
Robar v. LaBuda1
(decided April 28, 2011)
I.

THE MATTER OF ROBAR V. LABUDA

The petitioner, a hunter from Lumberton, New York, faced retrial following the declaration of a mistrial at the county court.2 The
petitioner sought a motion to stay retrial in order to seek “a writ of
prohibition [which would] preclud[e] a retrial on the criminal
charges” against the petitioner on the grounds of double jeopardy.3
Pursuant to one‟s rights under both the United States and New York
State Constitutions, a person shall not be placed in jeopardy more
than once for the same offense.4 The Appellate Division, Third Department, granted the petitioner‟s motion, pending review by special
proceeding.5 Upon review, the court, citing relevant statutory and
case law, ruled in favor of the petitioner, subsequently granted his petition, and held that retrial is precluded under the principle of double
jeopardy.6
The petitioner in this matter was originally “charged . . . with
the crimes of assault in the second degree and reckless endangerment
1

921 N.Y.S.2d 710 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 2011).
Id. at 713-15.
3
Id. at 715; see also N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6 (“No person shall be subject to be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense . . . .”).
4
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
5
Robar, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
6
Id.
2
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in the second degree,” stemming from an incident which occurred on
his property in which another hunter was mistakenly shot and injured
by the petitioner.7 At voir dire, defense counsel exercised a series of
peremptory challenges to remove five hunters from serving as jurors.8
The prosecution objected to these challenges, claiming that the hunters were inappropriately struck pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky9 and
its progeny.10 The county court allowed the challenges and excused
the challenged jurors, but reserved its right to decide on the propriety
of the Batson challenges.11 After another juror was struck on a seemingly similar basis, the prosecution objected a second time, to
which the court responded in the same manner as before.12 Following the completion of jury selection, “the court continued to reserve
decision” on the Batson arguments.13
After the prosecution presented its case and rested, the petitioner in this matter presented his testimony.14 The court then excused the jury in order to contemplate mistrial for an unrelated issue.15 The following day, the prosecution agreed with the court that
“a mistrial was necessary” and reasserted its Batson argument, which
was yet again reserved for decision by the court.16 Later that day, the
prosecution sent a letter to the court “asserting that they were not
seeking a mistrial,” and the defense similarly faxed a letter to the
court stating that it was distinctly opposed to a mistrial.17 The following day, the court ruled that petitioner‟s counsel violated the rule
of law in Batson, and subsequent cases, by using its peremptory challenges to remove jurors who belonged to a constitutionally-protected
class.18 Without regard to the letters from both parties concerning a
7

Id. at 713-14; see People v. Robar, 907 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (Sullivan Cnty. Ct. 2010).
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 714. For a discussion regarding the facts and reasoning of the
lower court‟s decision, see Andrew W. Koster, Note, People v. Robar, 27 TOURO L. REV.
885 (2011).
9
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
10
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
11
Id. (stating that the court “thereafter swore in the 10 remaining jurors who had not been
challenged”).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 714-15 (explaining that hunters exercise their fundamental right to bear arms,
8
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mistrial, the court decided in favor of the prosecution and declared
that a mistrial was the only proper “ „cure‟ for [such a] violation.”19
Following this decision, the petitioner commenced a new proceeding against the respondent, the County Judge of Sullivan County,
in order to seek a writ of prohibition in order to preclude retrial on the
grounds of double jeopardy.20 In reaching its ultimate decision to
grant the defendant‟s petition, the court relied heavily on both established case law as well as statutory prohibitions against retrial as
found in both the United States and New York Constitutions.21
In order for retrial to be an acceptable remedy for an inappropriate action taken by the prosecution to which the defendant objects,
the court looked to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution22 and the seminal federal court case on double jeopardy, United
States v. Perez,23 for guidance.24 The Constitution reads that no person may be subjected to jeopardy of life or limb twice for the same
offense.25 Therefore, where jeopardy has attached, the retrial of a
case is constitutionally barred, save a few exceptions.26 For example,
in such matters where the defendant does not consent to mistrial, the
court acknowledged that retrial is prohibited “unless „there is a manifest necessity for [the mistrial], or the ends of public justice would
otherwise be defeated,‟ ” as set forth in Perez.27 For there to exist a
“manifest necessity” warranting a mistrial and retrial without the
consent of the defendant, there must be a situation in which justice
would otherwise be defeated if the defendant was not subjected to a
subsequent retrial.28 The Supreme Court has also traditionally qualified “manifest necessity” as a situation in which there exists a “high

which is protected by the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution).
19
Id.
20
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
21
Id; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
22
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23
22 U.S. 579 (1824).
24
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16.
25
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16.
27
Id. at 716 (quoting Perez, 22 U.S. at 580).
28
Id. at 717 (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505-06 (1978) (explaining that,
in certain occasions, the defendant‟s right to have his case tried before the first jury impaneled “is sometimes subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full
and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury”)).
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degree” of need justifying retrial.29 In Robar, the Appellate Division,
Third Department, determined that the trial court failed to establish a
“manifest necessity,” and therefore abused its discretion requiring the
declaration of mistrial and subsequent retrial of the matter.30
In the event the court could find that the defendant somehow
agreed to a mistrial, the court would then need to determine whether
the defendant did so in response to improper actions on the part of the
prosecution, or the court itself.31 Traditionally, where a defendant
declares or consents to a mistrial, courts have rejected the application
of a double jeopardy analysis.32 The court in Robar acknowledged,
as does the Supreme Court, that there exists an exception which allows the defendant to raise the bar of double jeopardy, when it is
found that the actions of the prosecution or court improperly
“goad[ed] the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial.”33 In Robar, the
court emphasized that defense counsel unequivocally objected and
did not consent to a mistrial.34 Because the petitioner blatantly objected to a declaration of mistrial, retrial would be barred without a
showing of “manifest necessity,” which the court here noted, is lacking.35
The court in Robar also applied the holdings of Batson and its
progeny in determining whether or not the review of the Batson challenges constituted a sufficient ground for declaring a mistrial.36
While the approach taken by the county court determined that the
hunters made up a protected class under Batson, the appellate court
rejected this view.37 There is no codified requirement that “the
„jur[y] actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the

29

Id. (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 506).
Id.
31
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
32
Id.
33
Id. (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 716-17.
36
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (holding that a manifest necessity did not exist for retrial
on the basis of a violation of the jurors‟ constitutional rights).
37
Id. at 718 (emphasis in original) (“The fact that hunters may exercise their Second
Amendment right—a right certainly not limited to hunters or conferred upon them because
they are hunters—does not morph them into a cognizable group for equal protection purposes.”); see also Koster, supra note 8, at 888 (discussing the lower court‟s finding of a “ „Batson-„like‟ violation‟ in the defendant‟s removal of licensed hunters”).
30
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various distinctive groups in the population.‟ ”38 Furthermore, the
court held that the declaration of mistrial and subsequent retrial is an
improper approach to a Batson violation, as other more appropriate
remedies exist.39
The court also noted that Batson challenges are typically argued and decided prior to the swearing in of a jury and require the satisfaction of a three-prong analysis, as outlined in Batson and its
progeny.40 All remedies for a Batson violation, such as “granting the
nonoffending [sic] party additional peremptory challenges, or forfeiture of the peremptory challenges used [improperly]” cease to exist
upon the swearing in of the jury.41 Once the jury is impaneled, any
viable remedies for the improper use of peremptory challenges under
these cases are gone, and the court may not look to mistrial as a
means of rectifying such a situation under the guise of “manifest necessity” existing to do so.42 While an exception to this rule exists, it
only applies when the defendant moves for mistrial for the prosecution‟s improper use of Batson challenges, which was not applicable
in Robar.43
The court in Robar focused upon the notion, as previously established by the Court of Appeals in People v. Michael,44 that the
“prohibition against double jeopardy is fundamental not only to the
process of criminal justice, but to our system of government itself.”45
38

Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).
Id. at 719-20 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24 (stating that the judge should determine “whether it is more appropriate . . . for the trial court to discharge the venire and select
a new jury from a panel not previously associated with the case . . . or to disallow the discriminatory challenges”)).
40
Id. at 720. The three-prong analysis requires that:
First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor
has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the
requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to
articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question.
Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried
his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1991) (citations omitted).
41
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 719-20 (citing People v. Luciano, 890 N.E.2d 214, 219 (N.Y.
2008)).
42
Id. at 720.
43
Id.
44
394 N.E.2d 1134 (N.Y. 1979).
45
Id. at 1136 (stating that the constitutional bar against double jeopardy “serves as an important check on the potential power of the State”).
39

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [2012], Art. 23

898

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

The court in Robar, as noted previously, determined that the petitioner did not consent to a mistrial, and therefore did not waive his fundamental right to the protection against double jeopardy.46 Because
the defendant did not waive his protection against double jeopardy,
the court deferred to the state constitution for guidance on whether to
grant the defendant‟s petition.47 The New York State Constitution
stresses the inherent fundamental status of one‟s protection against
standing trial for the same crime twice without consent.48 The court
applied this concept when it granted the defendant‟s petition.49
The court also noted that the defendant retains the right to be
free from reprosecution of a matter in the event that the first trial had
not reached a conclusion.50 Here, the petitioner was subjected to a
trial in which a jury was sworn in and heard the prosecution‟s arguments and part of the defendant‟s testimony.51 The court, in comparing this situation to that of the defendant in People v. Baptiste,52 emphasized that a defendant has a significant interest in having the jury
render a verdict following the first attachment of jeopardy, barring a
deadlock or some other inability of that jury to reach said verdict.53
Because the petitioner in Robar had a “valued right” to have his case
decided by the original jury “on the first presentation of the evidence,” the court held that the county court judge should not have declared a mistrial and allowed the trial to continue regardless of the effect of the Batson challenges on the resulting jury.54
The court also recognized that the reasons for the grant of mistrial must be plain and clear, and in no way illusory or deceptive.55
In order for the trial court to conclude that a mistrial is necessary, it
46

Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 716-17.
Id. at 715 (stating that “a defense against prosecution premised upon constitutional
double jeopardy principles poses a question of law” to be determined by the court in accordance with constitutional provisions).
48
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
49
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
50
Id. at 715-16.
51
Id. at 714.
52
530 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1988).
53
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16 (referencing Baptiste, 530 N.E.2d at 380).
54
Id. at 716, 720.
55
Id. at 717 (citing Matter of Enright v. Siedlecki, 451 N.E.2d 176, 180 (N.Y. 1983)
(“The reasons underlying the grant of a mistrial may not be illusory; rather, in order fully to
protect the defendant‟s right to trial by a particular tribunal they must be necessitous, actual
and substantial.”)).
47
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falls upon the trial judge to use his or her discretion in determining
whether or not the burden of a “manifest necessity” has been
reached.56 The court in Robar held that the trial court judge abused
his discretion when he improperly granted a mistrial against the
wishes of the defendant and “without considering alternatives.”57
Due to such an abuse of discretion, the retrial was therefore barred.58
In a unanimous decision, the Appellate Division, Third Department, held in Robar that there was no existence of “manifest necessity” warranting a mistrial, and that “retrial of [the] petitioner is
barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy.”59 Because retrial
is not permitted on the same offense and the first trial was improperly
concluded by the judge‟s declaration of mistrial, the indictment
against the petitioner was dismissed and the petitioner may no longer
be tried on the charges contained in the original indictment.60

II.

FEDERAL APPROACH TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The Supreme Court of the United States has traditionally followed the holding of United States v. Perez when analyzing double
jeopardy.61 The Court in Perez considered whether the discharge of
the jury prior to issuing a verdict and without consent is grounds for a
bar to retrial of the matter.62 Because no verdict had been reached,
the defendant explained that he had a fundamental right as protected
by the Constitution to be released from custody.63 Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the Court, noted that the courts of the United
States are endowed “with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict . . . [where] there is a manifest necessity for the act, or

56
See Enright, 451 N.E.2d at 180-81 (stating that trial judge may grant a mistrial when no
other adequate alternative exists, and where there is a manifest necessity to do so).
57
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 717 (citing Enright, 451 N.E.2d at 180).
58
Id. at 717, 720.
59
Id. at 720 (holding that a manifest necessity for retrial must exist, more specifically in
situations where the defendant gave no consent to mistrial and did not waive his protection
from double jeopardy).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 716.
62
Perez, 22 U.S. at 579 (explaining that the jury, being unable to reach a verdict, was discharged by the Court without consent from either the defendant or the prosecution).
63
Id.
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the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.”64 The Court,
therefore, has the discretion to interfere with traditional judicial procedure, where there is a high degree of need to do so, in pursuit of a
greater justice.65 The Court highlighted the fact that it would be impossible to discern every situation that would satisfy the “manifest
necessity” standard.66 It did note, however, that future judges and
courts would need to exercise substantial care when interfering with
matters, such as these, that are subject to extreme scrutiny under the
protections of the Constitution.67
The Perez opinion has long been applied in actions involving
questions of double jeopardy. Since Perez, the Court has held that
retrial by a second jury may be allowed in matters where the first jury
was “discharged without reaching a verdict and without the defendant‟s consent.”68 In Downum v. United States,69 the prosecutor requested to have the jury discharged after being sworn in due to the
fact that one of the prosecution‟s key witnesses on a number of the
counts was not present.70 The defendant moved to have those counts
at issue dismissed and to continue with trial on the remaining counts,
to which the trial judge responded with a denial and then proceeded
to discharge the jury.71 After being found guilty, the defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed.72 Upon grant of certiorari,
the Supreme Court applied the standards from Perez and its progeny,
and, in its opinion, explained that the prosecution “t[akes] a chance”
when it impanels the jury “without first ascertaining whether or not
its witnesses were present.”73 In determining whether there was a violation of the protection against double jeopardy as stated in the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Court held that any
doubt should be resolved “in favor of the liberty of the citizen, rather
64

Id. at 580.
Id.
66
Id. (stating that “it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would render it
proper to interfere” with a defendant‟s constitutional protection against double jeopardy).
67
Perez, 22 U.S. at 580.
68
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 735-36 (1963) (citing Perez, 22 U.S. at 579
(“[T]he jury, being unable to agree, were discharged by the Court from giving any verdict
upon the indictment, without the consent of the prisoner . . . .”)).
69
372 U.S. 734 (1963).
70
Id. at 735.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 737 (quoting Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1931)).
65
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than exercise what would be an unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary
judicial discretion.”74 The Court here expounded upon and qualified
Justice Story‟s concept of “manifest necessity,” denoting that in all
double jeopardy matters where judicial discretion may be abused, the
Court should defer to what is most favorable to the defendant‟s liberty.75
In United States v. Dinitz,76 the Court examined whether a mistrial requested by the defendant, due to an error on the part of the
judge or prosecution, bars reprosecution under the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Constitution.77 Unlike the previous cases on this matter, where the defendant objected to or did not consent to retrial, Dinitz was the first time the Supreme Court directly dealt with the issue
of a defendant who requested a mistrial, but argued that retrial should
be barred under double jeopardy.78 Traditionally, a defendant‟s motion for mistrial is “assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution.”79 In its opinion the Court stated that, because the trial court did
not act in bad faith when it removed defendant‟s counsel due to improper conduct, this action cannot be seen to have been intended to
“provoke mistrial requests and thereby subject defendants to the substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions.”80 Because the
defendant would not be subjected to an undue burden by the retrial of
his matter, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause did not bar
reprosecution of the defendant.81
In Arizona v. Washington,82 the Court again evaluated the requirement for “manifest necessity” where there is gross misconduct
that would cause the jury to improperly favor one party over the oth74

Downum, 372 U.S. at 737.
Id. at 738; see also Perez, 22 U.S. at 580 (“Courts should be extremely careful how they
interfere with any of the chances of life, in favour of the prisoner.”).
76
424 U.S. 600 (1975).
77
Id. at 605-06.
78
Id. at 607.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 611 (stating that defense counsel‟s removal on the basis of his improper statements during opening arguments was not done in order to provoke defendant to move for a
mistrial).
81
Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 612; see id. at 613 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referencing United
States v. Dinitz, 492 F.2d 53, 61 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasizing the need for the Court to agree
with the panel hearing and look back to Justice Story‟s language that a “manifest necessity”
be present in order to merit retrial without violating the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy)).
82
434 U.S. 497 (1978).
75
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er.83 In this matter, the defendant was found guilty of murder, but
was later granted a new trial due to the withholding of exculpatory
evidence on the part of the prosecution.84 At the opening of the
second trial, defense counsel made inappropriate comments regarding
the prosecution‟s previous failure to disclose evidence.85 The prosecution responded with a motion for mistrial which was eventually
granted by the trial judge.86 The defendant subsequently filed a writ
of habeas corpus with the district court, which was granted on the basis that the trial judge inappropriately granted a mistrial absent an explicit finding of “manifest necessity.”87 Upon review by the Supreme
Court, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit‟s decision, explaining that
explicit use of the term “manifest necessity” by the trial court is not
requisite in finding that such a degree of necessity has been met.88
Further, the Court stated that the judge does not bear a burden to disclose “on the record all the factors which informed the deliberate exercise of his discretion.”89
The issue of prosecutorial misconduct as grounds for a defendant‟s request for mistrial and subsequent barring of retrial under
double jeopardy, as argued in Dinitz, was again brought before the
Court in Oregon v. Kennedy.90 The Court in Dinitz noted that an effort by the prosecution to “goad” the defendant into moving for a mistrial may bar reprosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 91 In
Kennedy, the prosecutor, on redirect examination of a witness, referred to the defendant as “a crook,” which prompted the defense to
83

Id. at 498.
Id.
85
Id. at 498-99.
86
Id. at 499, 501 (stating that, after a series of arguments regarding the motion for mistrial, the trial judge granted the motion “based upon defense counsel‟s remarks in his opening
statement concerning the Arizona Supreme Court opinion”).
87
Washington, 434 U.S. at 501-03 (stating that the Ninth Circuit affirmed, explaining that
the trial judge granted the mistrial without first determining “whether [or not] there could,
nevertheless, [still] be a fair trial” after the jury heard defense counsel‟s improper remarks).
88
Id. at 517 (explaining that a trial judge‟s declaration of a mistrial “is not subject to a
collateral attack in a federal court simply because he failed to find „manifest necessity‟ [by
using] those [exact] words”).
89
Id.
90
456 U.S. 667 (1982); see Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611.
91
Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611 (stating that reprosecution is barred where the defendant is
“provoke[d to motion for] a mistrial” by the prosecution‟s error, or the said error is either
motivated by “bad faith conduct by judge or prosecutor” or undertaken for the purposes of
“harassment of [the] accused”).
84
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motion for a mistrial.92 Because the defendant motioned for a mistrial, the Court determined that it is not required to show a “manifest
necessity” for a retrial after the declaration of mistrial.93 In applying
the Dinitz standard, the Court expressed that when the defendant
moves for a mistrial in a criminal proceeding, the grounds for barring
reprosecution under the Double Jeopardy clause are severely limited.94 Because the Court determined that the prosecution in Kennedy did not make its statement for the purposes of eliciting a motion
for mistrial from the defendant, reprosecution was not barred by the
Fifth Amendment.95

III.

NEW YORK STATE AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Article I, Section Six, of the New York State Constitution,
like the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, provides
for the protection of the individual from being tried twice for the
same offense.96 The courts of the State of New York have interpreted
the language of the Constitution to establish when reprosecution of a
matter is barred on the grounds of double jeopardy. A series of cases
reached the New York Court of Appeals and appellate departments in
which the courts have adopted a similar approach to double jeopardy
as taken by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In People v. Michael,97 the defendant sought a reversal of his
conviction at retrial on the grounds of double jeopardy after the original trial court “[s]ua sponte declared a mistrial as to defendant Michael, [both] without obtaining his consent and in the absence of his
counsel,” in light of the events that occurred during the trial
process.98 The mistrial was declared shortly after the trial began because defense counsel was unable to attend due to a death in the
92

Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 669.
Id. at 672 (citing Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 607-10 (stating that since the defendant moved to
end the trial by mistrial prior its culmination, a “manifest necessity” application is inapplicable)).
94
Id. at 679.
95
Id.
96
Michael, 394 N.E.2d at 1138 (“[T]he double jeopardy provisions of both our State Constitution and the Federal Constitution prohibit retrial for the same crime [twice]. . . .”).
97
394 N.E.2d 1134 (N.Y. 1979).
98
Id. at 1135.
93
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family.99 The court wished to have the trial completed by the end of
the same week, but was unable to proceed due to the unavailability of
defense counsel.100
Following his conviction at the second trial and the affirming
of that conviction at the appellate level, the defendant appealed to the
Court of Appeals, citing a violation of his protection against double
jeopardy under the state constitution.101 Upon review, the Court of
Appeals compared and contrasted the facts at bar with those of Perez
and its New York State counterparts.102 The Court of Appeals ultimately held that a mistrial for the purpose of judicial convenience absent “manifest necessity” is an abuse of discretion on the part of the
original trial judge, and, as a result, the conviction of the defendant
had to be reversed, and the original indictment dismissed.103
In the Matter of Enright v. Siedlecki,104 the Court of Appeals
addressed the declaration of a mistrial where the mistrial is based
upon the unacceptable biasing of the jury by an improper statement
made by the prosecution.105 This issue was brought before the Court
of Appeals to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion
by declaring a mistrial when the prosecution referenced a confession
given by the defendant subsequent to his request for counsel in its
statement, and, therefore, created an irreversible bias in the jury.106
Additionally, defense counsel, during discussion regarding mistrial,
stated openly that he believed there was no way “the jury could be
„sanitized‟ with respect to the defendant‟s inculpatory statement,”
and continued to object to a mistrial.107 While the trial judge agreed
in part with defense counsel when he stated that “[he did not] see
99

Id. at 1137 (stating that “the court received a phone call from the office of defendant‟s
attorney, notifying the court that the attorney‟s father had died unexpectedly” a few days after the start of the trial).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1138.
102
Michael, 394 N.E.2d at 1138 (discussing the reasoning behind Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court decisions where retrial has been permitted without violating the constitutional protections of the defendant against double jeopardy).
103
Id. at 1138-39.
104
451 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1983).
105
Enright, 451 N.E.2d at 179 (“[D]espite [the judge‟s] instructions to [this] jury [to disregard prosecutor‟s inappropriate remarks], it‟s impossible to unring a bell.”).
106
Id. at 180 (acknowledging that the trial judge‟s assessment of the circumstances surrounding the declaration of a mistrial should be afforded “the highest degree of respect”
when being reviewed by an appellate court).
107
Id. at 178.
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how [the defendant] could get a fair trial with all th[ese issues],” he
ultimately declared a mistrial.108
The Court of Appeals reviewed the defense‟s claim of a violation of the defendant‟s protection against double jeopardy.109 The
court held that the declaration of a mistrial and subsequent retrial is
appropriate and constitutional where there is “gross misconduct” on
the part of the defendant or his counsel, or where it is “impossible to
proceed [fairly] with the trial” in accordance with applicable law.110
Therefore, the court determined that the trial judge, in considering the
inappropriate actions and behaviors of defense counsel and the unavailability of a key witness, found a “manifest necessity” to declare
a mistrial and order retrial, and did not abuse his discretion in doing
so.111
In People v. Baptiste,112 a mistrial was declared at the first trial when the jury took a substantial period of time to deliberate and
decide upon a verdict.113 Defense counsel did not consent to a mistrial, yet it was granted because, as the trial judge stated, “if they can‟t
reach a verdict, it has to be a mistrial.”114 In a unanimous decision,
the Court of Appeals held that there was an abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial judge in declaring a mistrial absent a “manifest necessity” to do so.115 The foreman of the jury indicated that there had
been some movement, but that it may not be able to reach a verdict
by the deadline set by the court.116 To the Court of Appeals, that
statement on the record indicated that the jury was still fully capable
108

Id. at 181.
Id. at 178.
110
Enright, 451 N.E.2d at 179-80 (stating that mistrial is necessary “when it is physically
impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with law”).
111
Id. at 181 (“Where, for reasons deemed compelling by the trial judge . . . the ends of
substantial justice cannot be attained without discontinuing the trial, a mistrial may be declared without the defendant‟s consent and even over his objection, and he may be retried
consistently with the Fifth Amendment.”); id. at 182 (Jones and Simmons, JJ., dissenting)
(quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 689 (arguing that the majority made an improper determination to allow the mistrial, and that, as a result, the defendant was being deprived of his
“valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal”)).
112
530 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1988).
113
Id. at 379.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 380-81 (elucidating that there was no indication that the jury found itself so
“hopelessly deadlocked” that it could not reach a verdict, and, therefore, declaration of a mistrial is an improper remedy).
116
Id. at 380.
109
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of eventually reaching a verdict, and that the trial judge allowed them
an insufficient amount of time to render a decision.117 Therefore, “as
a matter of law,” the defendant could not be subjected to reprosecution of the matter.118
In People v. Adames,119 a unique procedural situation presented itself regarding the defense‟s request for a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct.120 At trial, the prosecution was admonished
for improperly questioning the defendant and co-defendant, and,
when it continued to happen, the defense counsel motioned for mistrial.121 At that time, the trial judge “reserved decision [on the motion]” and allowed the trial to continue.122 Upon the jury‟s rendering
of a guilty verdict, the trial judge chose to then decide upon the mistrial motion, and ultimately vacated the verdict.123
Upon review by the Court of Appeals, the court considered
whether it should adopt a new standard that retrial should be barred in
situations where “the case proceeded to verdict before the selected
jury, [and where] the trial conduct of the prosecutors is grossly and
fundamentally prejudicial to defendant‟s fair trial rights.”124 A unanimous court held that, in matters such as this, the court should not
“depart from the general analytical mode for deciding such cases,” as
established in the Kennedy holding.125 Furthermore, the vacatur, as
issued by the trial court judge, was a similar sort of relief as would be
granted by an appellate court, and therefore, cannot be viewed as a
bar to retrial.126
The Court of Appeals also addressed whether mistrial, and
subsequent retrial, is the appropriate remedy to prosecutorial miscon117

Baptiste, 530 N.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 381 (emphasizing that the jurors were not afforded a sufficient amount of time to
properly deliberate on the case).
119
629 N.E.2d 391 (N.Y. 1983).
120
Id. at 392.
121
Id. (stating that the prosecution‟s badgering of the defendants in regards to their police
interviews was improper).
122
Id. at 392-93.
123
Id. at 393 (stating that the defendant was convicted at his retrial and appealed to the
First Department, which rejected his double jeopardy claim and affirmed defendant‟s conviction).
124
Adames, 629 N.E.2d at 393.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 394 (“In such instances [as this case], the double jeopardy bar to retrial should
not attach and the correct and proportionate remedy should allow for retrial.”).
118
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duct at the original trial in Gorghan v. DeAngelis.127 At trial, the
prosecution continuously mentioned “evidence of petitioner‟s prior
uncharged criminal and immoral acts” previously deemed inadmissible.128 Defense motioned for a mistrial several times, which were denied by the court, and the defendant was subsequently found guilty
on all charges.129
The defendant, following the Appellate Division‟s reversal of
the conviction and remand for a new trial, petitioned the court in order to bar retrial on the grounds of double jeopardy, which was denied by the Appellate Division, Third Department.130 The appellate
court determined that the actions taken by the prosecution were made
in order to “secur[e] a conviction, not . . . to provoke defendant into
moving for a mistrial.”131 The Court of Appeals, in maintaining its
view in Adames, affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, and
stated that a new trial is a sufficient remedy for matters where “defendants suffer both prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct . . . and erroneous denial of a mistrial motion.”132
The Matter of Rivera v. Firetog133 presented the Court of Appeals with the question of whether a judge must ask the jury whether
it had reached a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial on the
grounds of jury deadlock.134 At trial, the jury was presented with
three counts on which to render a verdict, with instructions that each
of the latter counts should not be considered if the jury found the defendant to be guilty of the higher charge.135 Deliberations continued
for days, prompting the judge to ask if the jury had reached a verdict
on any of the charges, to which the defendant‟s counsel “countered
that there was some indication that the jury had progressed past the
first count and requested the court to inquire about the possibility of a

127

857 N.E.2d 523, 524 (N.Y. 2006).
Id.
129
Id. at 524-25 (stating that, on appeal from the county court, the Appellate Division determined that the proper remedy to the misconduct of the prosecution would be a new trial
and remitted to the lower court).
130
Id.
131
Id. (quoting Gorghan v. DeAngelis, 808 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t
2006)).
132
Gorghan, 857 N.E.2d at 525-26.
133
900 N.E.2d 952 (N.Y. 2008).
134
Id. at 953.
135
Id.
128
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partial verdict.”136 The judge did not inquire about partial verdict and
deliberations continued.137 Mistrial was eventually declared because
no verdict was reached and the defendant subsequently “filed a written motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.”138
In reviewing the appeal of the granted motion, the Court of
Appeals ultimately reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division
and dismissed the petition.139 In delivering the majority opinion, the
court examined this case‟s relationship to People v. Baptiste and Arizona v. Washington, in which the Court of Appeals determined that a
mistrial on the grounds of a jury deadlock is to “involve[ ] the exercise of judicial discretion.”140 The Court of Appeals held that the trial
judge acted with reasonable discretion when he declared a mistrial on
the basis of the three jury deadlock notes he received.141

IV.

COMPARING FEDERAL AND STATE APPROACHES TO DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AND REPROSECUTION

The federal court and the courts of New York have taken a
similar approach to issues involving protection of a defendant from
double jeopardy. In determining whether retrial would violate a defendant‟s due process rights under the Constitution, the federal judiciary has consistently deferred to the seminal doctrine as set forth in
Perez. Perez‟s holding that a “manifest necessity” need be present in
order for the bar to retrial to be done away with is consistently reiterated throughout its progeny.142
136

Id. at 954.
Id. The prosecution requested a mistrial on the basis of a continuance of jury deadlocks. In response, the defense requested that the judge yet again check for a partial verdict,
which the judge declined doing, since the jury made no statement declaring that it had
reached one. Rivera, 900 N.E.2d at 954.
138
Id. (stating that the motion was granted by the Appellate Division, and subsequently
reviewed by the Court of Appeals).
139
Id. at 955.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 956; Rivera, 900 N.E.2d at 958-59 (Pigott, J., dissenting) (stating that defense
counsel‟s argument that the trial court had a duty to inquire as to a partial verdict was correct, especially if there was a chance that the jury did not know it could return such a verdict).
142
Perez, 22 U.S. at 580 (“We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested
Courts . . . with the authority to discharge a jury . . . whenever . . . there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.”).
137
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The cases on double jeopardy heard by the Supreme Court after Perez have interpreted the meaning of “manifest necessity.” The
Court in Washington determined that Justice Story‟s “necessity”
could not be read literally, but rather, it meant that there is a lofty
burden that must be met by the prosecution to show that mistrial and
subsequent retrial is the appropriate remedy for the issue at bar.143
Through its application of this standard, the Court has predominantly
held in favor of retrial in the majority of cases regarding double jeopardy.144 Unless an egregious abuse of discretion has been exercised
by a trial judge as in Downum, the Supreme Court has been reluctant
to hold that retrial would be barred by the Fifth Amendment.145
The courts of New York State have followed a similar pattern
to that of the Supreme Court regarding the barring of reprosecution of
the defendant under Article I, Section Six of the state constitution. A
majority of the mistrial declarations in lower courts that have been
appealed to the Court of Appeals have resulted from what is claimed
to be an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge. The
Court of Appeals in Michael, while not directly stating so, seems to
focus more on Justice Story‟s latter words in the Court‟s opinion in
Perez:
They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject;
and it is impossible to define all the circumstances,
which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure,
the power ought to be used with the greatest caution,
under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and
obvious causes; and, in capital cases especially, Courts
should be extremely careful how they interfere with
any of the chances of life, in favour of the prisoner.146

143
Washington, 434 U.S. at 506 (“[I]t is manifest that the key word „necessity‟ cannot be
interpreted literally; instead, contrary to the teaching of Webster, we assume that there are
degrees of necessity and we require a “high degree” before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate.”).
144
See, e.g., Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667; Washington, 434 U.S. 497; Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600.
145
Downum, 372 U.S. at 738 (“We resolve any doubt „in favor of the liberty of the citizen,
rather than exercise what would be an unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary judicial
discretion.‟ ”).
146
Michael, 394 N.E.2d at 1138 (emphasis added) (referring to Perez, 22 U.S. at 580).
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The discretion of the trial judge is to determine “whether a mistrial is
necessary,” not just convenient or one of a number of potential options.147 In many of the cases composing Michael’s progeny, the
Court of Appeals has given deference to the actions of the trial judge,
and determined that they had not abused their discretion in declaring
a mistrial and subsequent retrial.148
The holdings of Baptiste and, more recently, Robar, have
marked a deviation from the traditional approach of the New York
courts to cases involving double jeopardy as a bar to reprosecution.149
The Court of Appeals in Baptiste, and the Third Department in Robar
both determined that the trial judges abused their discretion in declaring mistrials, and that reprosecution is barred by both the New York
and United States Constitutions.150 The majority of New York State
court decisions have held otherwise, finding that “manifest necessity”
existed and favoring retrial of the defendant.151

V.

IMPLICATIONS AND VALUE OF ROBAR V. LABUDA

The decision in Robar v. LaBuda is a triumph for supporters
of a strict interpretation of the both the United States Constitution and
the New York State Constitution. Both constitutions provide for a
protection of an individual from being placed in jeopardy twice for
the same offense.152 While the court in Robar is respectful of and
compliant with binding judicial precedent, it is also mindful of the
implications if it were to permit reprosecution of a defendant. By allowing the prosecution a second chance to convict after the court fails
to act in a procedurally-appropriate manner (in this case, rendering a
mistrial after reviewing the Batson arguments following the impaneling of a jury), the court is, in effect, disregarding the intent of the
147

Id.
See Rivera, 900 N.E.2d 952; Gorghan, 857 N.E.2d 523; Adames, 629 N.E.2d 391;
Enright, 451 N.E.2d 176.
149
See Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 720 (stating that where “[a] mistrial [is] not [a] necessary”
remedy to an issue at trial, “retrial . . . is barred” by the state and federal constitutions); Baptiste, 530 N.E.2d at 381 (stating that, “as a matter of law,” reprosecution is an inappropriate
remedy where a true abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge can be shown).
150
Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 720; Baptiste, 530 N.E.2d at 381.
151
See Rivera, 900 N.E.2d 952; Gorghan, 857 N.E.2d 523; Adames, 629 N.E.2d 391;
Enright, 451 N.E.2d 176.
152
U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. I § 6.
148
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framers of the Constitution, and risks undermining the key principles
of the United States criminal judicial system.
The court in Robar arrived at its conclusion in a manner
which deviates slightly from the course of previous double jeopardy
cases, further enhancing the protections given to the accused. While
focusing on the same seminal “manifest necessity” doctrine as followed by its predecessors, the court in Robar promotes a much more
stringent interpretation of Justice Story‟s hallowed words: “The power [to discharge a jury or to reprosecute] ought to be used with the
greatest caution.”153 The holding in this case may mark the point
where the Third Department differs slightly from the other courts of
New York and the federal courts, by focusing less on trying to stretch
or interpret the trial record in favor of retrial, and more on the civil
liberties and rights of the accused.154 Recently, the other appellate
departments of New York have all taken pro-retrial stances in their
findings of “manifest necessity” in cases regarding mistrials and
double jeopardy.155 The Third Department‟s decision in Robar remains a singular beacon in the state appellate courts for greater judicial deference to a defendant‟s constitutional protection against
double jeopardy.
The Robar decision is also a refreshing ruling in an era where
the fundamental rights of the citizens of the United States have become somewhat limited in favor of national security. Through acts of
law, such as the USA PATRIOT ACT,156 Congress has granted government bodies the ability to overreach certain constitutional limitations and protections in order to prevent or protect against terrorist
acts. While seemingly unrelated to double jeopardy as mentioned in
Robar and its antecedents, it demonstrates a willingness of the legislative arm of the United States to overstep clearly spelled-out protections of individual rights under the Constitution. Decisions, like that
153

Perez, 22 U.S. at 580.
See Robar, 921 N.Y.S.2d at 718 n.5 (emphasis in original) (“[I]t is not the role of a reviewing court to „search the record‟ to decipher an alternative ground that we are convinced
would have supported a mistrial.”).
155
See, e.g., People v. Pearson, 911 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (App. Div 2d Dep‟t 2010); Marte
v. Berkman, 895 N.Y.S.2d 376 (App. Div 1st Dep‟t 2010); People v. Hernandez, 849
N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2007).
156
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.).
154
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of Robar, demonstrate the judicial branch‟s dedication to maintaining
the balance of power and protection of personal freedoms.
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